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on the whole,
be able to
argue more
persuasively.
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The fallowing essay is based on the talk
"Law and Literature: Examining the Limited
Legal Imagination in the Traditional Legal
Canon," delivered at the Fourth Annual
Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conjerence at Rutgers
University-Camden in February. The
complete talk will be part of the conjerence
proceedings that are forthcoming from
Rutgers University Press.

Persuasion, I suggest, should not be
understood as an exercise in argument
and counter-argument, as if it were a
tennis match - won by hitting shots an
adversary is unable to return. Instead,
persuasion is best thought of as a process
of making or finding space for a given
outcome in another person's world view.
Rather than looking for arguments an
adversary will be unable to deny, we
should look for arguments an adversary
will be able to affirm. This in turn
depends upon developing as full and
nuanced as possible an understanding of
that adversary's view of the world. Thus
persuasion depends upon imagination,
and in particular upon a certain
imaginative capacity to see the world
from the perspective of others. Reading
may be the best way to develop that
capacity.
In this light, I offer an argument for
understanding and engaging with the
inner life of even those who refuse to
return the favor. While author Martha
Nussbaum advocates the individualized
understanding promoted by literature as
a check on selfish reason, I offer a selfish
reason for individualized understanding.
We need the capacity to understand
others - to engage fully and honestly
with other people's individualized views
of the world - because it is that capacity
which enables us to persuade.
As evidenced by the subject matter of
this conference, substantial attention has
been focused on the way in which
literature (along with literary methods)
can bring to the table voices and
perspectives which might otherwise go

unrecognized or unappreciated. Most
essentially, powerful narrative voices may
help debunk the notion of
"perspectivelessness" whereby a
dominant mode of thought becomes so
familiar and accepted that it begins to
seem so natural as not to seem a
"perspective" at all, but rather a valuefree objective stance. Literature can in
this way broaden the scope of legal
discourse. By pressing the limits of what
can be imagined, we can encourage or
enable those in power to see issues from
the perspectives of those who have been
excluded. I suggest that we might,
pedagogically at least, benefit from a
steady dose of our own medicine.
A willingness to engage is of little use
without the capacity to do so. And
capacity, in this context, means
imagination. Reading may be the best
way to develop the capacity for, and to
become comfortable with, the required
sort of imaginative leap. When one reads
Anna Karenina, for example, one comes
to know life as it is experienced by Anna,
and not only by Anna. One sees also the
world as it appears to Vronsky, and how
the same world is a very different place
indeed to Levin. Or consider Toni
Morrisons Beloved, through which one
enters into a view of the world in which
the most unthinkable of acts become
frighteningly comprehensible. Reading
accustoms one to the imaginative leap,
and illuminates the difference between
fitting a person into our world and
understanding the world as it appears to
that person. An education in great books,
therefore, is in part a continuing exercise
in exposure to and immersion in
different worlds.

To a substantial extent, of course, we
can gain this sort of exposure through
interactions with real people. Ideally, we
should travel broadly and with an open
mind. We should engage and interact
with those whose perspectives are
different from ours - even, or perhaps
especially, when we have nothing in
particular to gain from the interaction,
where we are not trying to persuade. We
should, but we too often do not. Life is
short, and circumstances constrain our
intercourse. We naturally, if not
inevitably, form communities consisting
largely of those whose views on basic
matters are similar to our own. Reading
has the potential to let us get to know
more people, and more different sorts of
people, than we could hope to engage
with face to face in even the fullest life.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe
that the exposure possible through
reading is in some ways superior, at least
pedagogically, to the sorts of interactions
we can have in the real world.
Consider, for example, Kazuo
lshiguros masterful short novel The
Remains of the Day. The novel is a first
person account of the life, during the
years surrounding the second world war,
of an English butler named Stevens. Seen
from the outside, Stevens appears the
very picture of those for whom we have
the least respect, and the least success
persuading. He is a product of an
established order. In defense of that
order, in defense of his place within it, he
lives and acts in a way which we can
only find cold and uncaring, if not cruel.
Not only does he live what seems to us
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like a pinched and narrow emotional
existence, he as well takes actions which
are utterly unacceptable. He serves a
boss, Lord Darlington, who epitomizes
the British aristocratic tendency toward
pre-war Nazi appeasement. More
damning, Stevens, with an apparently
unquestioning willingness to accede to
Darlington's desire not to discomfort his
German guests, fires two Jewish
housemaids. From our perspective,
Stevens' choices appear inexplicable.
More precisely, they appear explicable
only as the actions of a narrow, smallminded man - interested only in
preserving his place in a fading, insular
world.
But Ishiguro lets us see Stevens from
his own perspective. He show us how
such terrible choices could be, to
Stevens, not only acceptable but
required. We come to comprehend the
conception of dignity to which Stevens,
like his father before him, has devoted
his life. We recognize the central role that
a particular vision of duty and obligation
plays in his world view. We can even
learn to appreciate the appeal of that
vision - in which the very notion of
duty implies an ongoing tension between
"ought" and "must." In short, we come to
understand the way in which Stevens
understands the world.
Understand, but not share. We can
comprehend Stevens without feeling any
obligation to share his perspective. And
we can do this, I think, because we have
no stake in Stevens himself. He is neither
a friend, whom we might be reluctant to
condemn, nor an enemy, with whom we
might be reluctant to engage. He is, after
all, just a character in a book. And
therein lies the power of literature to
offer fuller engagement with lower risk.
It allows us to go down into the mud
without getting dirty, or at least without
being irreparably stained. Knowing that
we can close the book - that we can
break the suspension of disbelief - we
feel safe, or at least safer, engaging. In
this way reading not only allows us to
get to know more people, and more
different sorts of people, than would be
possible otherwise, it lets us get to know
them from just the right distance.
Real people, by contrast, are often too
far away, or too close. On the one hand,
people will rarely be willing to open up
their minds and hearts to us in the way a
novelist reveals the inner worlds of fully
86

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

drawn characters. Even were they
willing, it is not clear that many would
be able to, given the opacity of our own
world views even to ourselves. Most
people are in this sense too far away. Or
they are too close. Given the difficulty,
we can come to know well very few
people in our lives, and each represents a
terrible investment. By the time,
therefore, that we have come to know a
person, a real person, as well as an artist
lets us come to know a well drawn
character, we will often have lost the
ability to think about them clearly. By the
time we get fully into their heads, they
will have often worked their way into
our hearts. We can love or hate, admire
or despise, but we will often find it hard
simply to evaluate.
But that is what sympathetic
engagement demands. And that is what
reading lets us do. We can recognize and
appreciate the world view which led
Stevens to believe what the choices he
made were right and appropriate. But we
do not really care about Stevens himself
because, really, there is no Stevens. There
is no danger of finding bad faith in a
person we have come to love, and, more
to the point, there is no danger of finding
good faith in a person or group we have
committed ourselves to seeing as an
enemy. We can let ourselves go more
fully because we know, in the back of
our minds, that we are relatively safe.
Engagement, like high-wire walking, is
not death defying when done with the
benefit of a net.
I do not mean to present an
oversimplified or falsely rosy picture of
the ways in which we can and do engage
with great literature. We enter into the
lives of fully drawn characters in
complex ways and with varying motives.
Nor would it be accurate to say that
engagement through literature is risk
free, in the sense that we will emerge
from our encounters with literary
characters unchanged. If I am correct in
saying that what we know - what we
have come to comprehend - becomes a
part of who we are, then learning means
change. Many of us can point to certain
books which opened up such new
intellectual and conceptual vistas they
"changed our lives." If so, it may be that
much of what we read has gradual and

imperceptible impact on identity. In the
end, however, if we are unable to face
growth and change - if our world views
are too fragile to survive even the
relatively safe engagement made possible
by great books - we will have little
hope of facing successfully the risks
inherent in true engagement with the real
people we must come to terms with in
our life and work.
What sort of books should we read?
My focus here is on the pedagogical
value of reading itself, rather than on the
particular insights to be gleaned from
this book or that. The goal is to get used
to the idea that the worlds of others are
as rich and nuanced as our own. To that
end, the great thing is to search out
works which bring to life worlds, and
world views, other than our own. I
recognize the appeal of books which
seem to capture our own perspectives to give expression and validation to our
own thoughts and understandings. The
capacity required for persuasion,
however, hinges on triangulating !ife
from alternative points of view.
In this context, however, I do not
embrace diversity as the sole or even
primary criterion. I reject this reading of
my argument because I believe it
encourages a misunderstanding of the
way in which literature develops ones
capacity to understand others.
Sympathetic engagement is a process of
understanding the perspectives of others,
not of attributing to others one or
another of some previously acquired
catalogue of perspectives. One does not
understand people by fitting them into
ready-made boxes. Thus I recommend
Ralph Ellison not because he reveals the
"black perspective" as if there were such
a single, undifferentiated thing, but
rather because he brings to life world
views very different from those held by
many of the students and lawyers I
encounter, and because he does so with
unparalleled force and art. For the same
reason, I recommend Jane Austen,
despite the fact that the perspectives of
the characters she portrays are hardly
those which we are likely to encounter
on a regular basis. Rather than the
substance of the different world views
one encounters through literature, it is
the process of entering fully into those
world views which develops the sort of
imagination necessary to sympathetic
engagement. Thus the key is to read
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carefully those rare works which make
that full entry possible. It is important for
those works to represent as wide as
possible a range of perspectives, but it is
critical that they portray the worlds they
do with the verisimilitude and narrative
strength required to make them real.
We might hope that literature, in
addition to helping us understand those
we seek to persuade, could do more to
help us figure out how actually to go
about persuading. Might certain works
model for us the very process of
persuasion itself - the very act of a
mind being changed? Consider the scene
from Macbeth in which Lady Macbeth
persuades Macbeth to go through with
the plan to murder Duncan.
Macbeth, in the soliloquy which
opens the scene, decides not to go
through with the murder. The reasons he
gives are fundamentally moral, rather
than prudential. To kill Duncan would
be to violate the cardinal values of loyalty
and hospitality. Moreover, Duncan is
such a decent man, and such a good
king, that the very heavens would cry
out against the deed. Macbeth simply
cannot bring himself to do it. Enter Lady
Macbeth. The reasons he gives her,
however, are not those he has given
himself. He argues to her that, instead of
killing Duncan, that they should instead
revel in the honors which Duncan has
recently bestowed upon Macbeth. Lady
Macbeth does not buy it for a minute. In
fact, she does not even respond to
Macbeths reasons. Rather, she strikes the
chords she knows will resonate with
Macbeths struggle to understand himself
and his place in the world. She
challenges his courage, his constancy,
and his manhood. Macbeth goes for it,
and Duncans fate is sealed.
Above all, this familiar episode
illustrates the extent to which persuasion
is not a process of meeting and defeating
arguments. Lady Macbeth's successful
arguments are hardly responsive to
Macbeth's stated reasons. This does not
mean that Macbeth was arguing
dishonestly. We have no reason to believe
that Macbeth did not really care about
loyalty and hospitality, and perhaps even
about the honors he described to Lady
Macbeth. What we do know, however, is
that Lady Macbeth found things he cared
about more.

What she found in particular, was that
while Macbeth may have been unwilling
to betray Duncan, his king, kinsman,
and guest, he was even less willing to
betray himself. Lady Macbeth does not
rely on moral principles, or prudential
arguments. The only thing she holds
before Macbeth is Macbeth himself:
". . . Art thou afeard
To be the same in thine act and valor
As thou are in desire? Wouldst thou
have that
Which thou esteemst the ornament
of life,
And live a coward in thine
own Esteem."
And that does it. Lady Macbeth
persuades by showing Macbeth that
going through with the murder is the
least troubling fit with his evolving sense
of who he wants to be.
In addition to reminding us that
persuasion is not simply, or even
primarily, about refuting our adversaries'
arguments, what Lady Macbeths success
suggests is that arguments do not always
need to "change" another persons mind.
It will not always be necessary to effect a
marked alteration in the features of a
persons mental landscape, even where a
persons current opinions and stated
arguments appear diametrically opposed
to our own. Instead, arguments in some
cases need only highlight or emphasize
certain features - increase or decrease
the tension between different aspects of a
persons world view.
On one hand, this scene highlights
the importance and potential power of
engagement. On the other hand, it can
be misleading. Moments of dramatic
catharsis are the exception, not the rule,
and it would be a mistake to look in
most cases for a magic key of the sort
used by Lady Macbeth to unlock the
psyche of her recalcitrant husband. In
particular, Lady Macbeths appeal to
Macbeths self-understanding, while
illustrative, is more direct than will often
be possible with real-world persuasive
arguments. It will rarely be effective to
simply assert that a given course of
action is the best or only fit with an
adversarys self-understanding. We more
often face the daunting task of trying to
demonstrate or suggest - through
arguments, examples, analogies, and all
the varied tools of rhetoric - that our
desired outcome does in fact have a
home in that persons world.

t'adig
has the
potential to
let us
get to know
more people,
and more
different sorts
of people,
than we
could hope to
engage with
face to face
in even the
fullest life.
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In this context, it might be further
suggested that the study of literature can
help develop the capacity for this final
step in persuasion - the actual making
or delivering of arguments. Perhaps
exposure to excellent forms of expression
can help us learn to express ourselves
more effectively I do not reject this
possibility, but nor am I willing to defend
the claim that reading great books
amounts to an education in the arts of
rhetoric. The essentially passive capacity
for immersion in competing world views
seems to me distinct from the active
capacity for expression in its various
forms . Fortunately, a lack of rhetorical
skill, per se, does not appear to be our
problem. We are more than sufficiently
articulate. What we seem to lack is an
understanding of how to focus that
rhetorical talent.
Nothing I have said is intended to
reject the possibility that literary
techniques might play a more active, as
opposed to diagnostic, role in the
persuasive endeavor. Narrative can be an
effective form of argument. But narrative
arguments, like all others, must be both
well made and well directed if they are to
be persuasive. As to the need for
arguments of all sorts to be well made, it
should go without saying that heavyhanded amateur fiction will be no more
persuasive than weak or poorly
supported logic. More to the point, just
as the most elegant logical argument will
fail to connect unless guided by an
understanding of the person it seeks to
reach, the most powerfully told story will
not hit home unless informed by a
thoroughly imagined understanding of
the world view in which it must
resonate.

Conclusion
I recognize that the argument offered
here will strike some as misplaced, even
perverse, given the forum in which it is
presented. A central theme of the
emerging narrative and critical race
scholarship has been "naming our own
reality" The fundamental project, in a
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sense, has been to create or recover our
own ways of thinking - to force the
dominant social order to acknowledge
our experiences, our lives, our stories.
And here I am talking about how we can
better learn to understand the
perspectives of those we seek to
persuade.
But there you have it. The more we
need to make ourselves understood, the
more it becomes necessary that we strive
to understand. It has been asserted by
Nancy L. Cook, in her article "Outside
the Tradition: literature as Legal
Scholarship" (63 University of Cincinnati
Law Review 95 , 110 (1994]) that
"because of the social realities , the very
act of writing, done by any person of
color, necessarily becomes either a threat
or an appeasement." Wrong. We should
and do under some circumstances write
in ways designed to threaten, or at least
provoke , in order to pave the way for
change. But to suggest that we must
either threaten or appease is to rule out a
major part of what lawyers do . We argue.
We reach out to others as people, rather
than as anonymous representatives of
"the dominant social order." And, at least
through some of our writing and speech,
we try to get results.
Just as some will find my argument
misplaced, others will find it utterly
unremarkable. The interesting thing
about a plea for sympathetic engagement
is that people tend to find it either
perverse or banal, depending on whether
it is directed at them or at their
adversaries.
Although references to Richard
Wright's Native Son seem to have become
something of a trope in law and literature
scholarship, I fear that I must follow suit:
"For the first time in his life he had
gained a pinnacle of feeling upon
which he could stand and see vague
relations that he had never dreamed
of. If that white looming mountain of
hate were not a mountain at all, but
people, people like himself, and like
Jan - then he was faced with a high
hope that the like of which he had
never thought possible, and a despair
that the full depths of which he knew
he could not stand to feel. "
One reading of this passage is that
Bigger experienced both high hope and
deep despair because he perceived, from
the depths of his misery, two things at
once. He saw the possibility of reaching

as individuals those he once saw as
faceless sources of hate. And he saw the
terrible difficulty and risk which would
attend such an effort.
The uniqueness of each person means
that it may be possible to reach any one
of them as to any given issue - that
there may be toeholds on what
sometimes looks like a sheer mountain of
hate. But it means as well that that
mountain will have to be surmounted
one person at a time. It means that there
is no magic bullet - no single political
or rhetorical move which will break
through the prejudice and open up a
new world. Instead, persuasion, and
therefore progress, is and will remain a
painfully slow, person by person exercise
in difficult undramatic coming to terms.

Sherman J. Clark is a graduate of Towson
State University and Harvard University Law
School. He practiced in Washington, D.C.,
where he primarily focused on product liability
and contract litigation. An assistant professor
who joined the faculty in 1995, he is interested
in democratic theory and political philosophy.

